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Rethinking the Boundaries of “Criminal Justice” 
 
 
Benjamin Levin* 
 
THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra 
Natapoff eds., N.Y.U. Press 2017). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“[T]he criminal justice ‘system’ is not a system at all,” observed Lawrence 
Friedman in his 1993 history of punishment in the United States.1  Over twenty 
years later, John Pfaff concluded that “[t]he criminal justice ‘system’ in the United 
States . . . is not a ‘system’ at all, but rather a chaotic swirl of local, county, state, 
and (less frequently) federal actors, all with different constituencies and 
incentives.”2  And this framing of U.S. criminal law, enforcement, and 
adjudication as fragmented and balkanized has become a common theme in 
contemporary literature.3 
                                                                                                                                      
*   Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School.  For helpful comments and 
conversations, thanks to Jenny Braun, Eric Miller, Carolyn Ramsey, Scott Skinner-Thompson, and 
the editors of The Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law. 
1   LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 461 (1993). 
2   John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2013) (reviewing ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE 
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2011)).  Cf. generally Bernard E. Harcourt, 
The Systems Fallacy: From Operations Research to Contemporary Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Perils 
of Systems Analysis, Past and Present (Apr. 7, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3062867 [https://perma.cc/MY6X-887X] (tracing the use of “criminal justice system” as 
a concept in legal and social thought); Sara Mayeux, The Idea of the “Criminal Justice System,” AM. 
J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3050263 [https:
//perma.cc/E54D-DHSH] (same). 
3   See, e.g., Walter J. Dickey & Peggy A. McGarry, The Search for Justice and Safety 
Through Community Engagement: Community Justice and Community Prosecution, 42 IDAHO L. 
REV. 313, 362 (2006) (“It is common wisdom that the criminal justice system is not a system.  It is 
not organized and directed to seek and achieve a single goal.  Rather, it is a collection of usually 
autonomous agencies, each pursuing its own aims.”); Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of 
Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 558 (2015) (“The criminal justice 
system lags behind most other government agencies when it comes to data tracking, for a very simple 
reason: the ‘system’ is not a system at all.  Instead, it is a loose affiliation among independent law 
enforcement agencies, individual counties, local jails, and state prisons.”); Daniel Richman, Federal 
Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—the Center Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1401 
(2008) (arguing that the federal system of criminal law enforcement “is not a system at all”); Gregory 
C. Keating, Note, Settling Through Consent Decree in Prison Reform Litigation: Exploring the 
Effects of Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 34 B.C. L. REV. 163, 198 (1992) (“The Task Force 
[on Justice addressing the problem of prison overcrowding] concluded that the criminal justice 
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In fact, not only have scholars critiqued the characterization of the criminal 
justice system as a system, but some scholars and activists have begun to challenge 
the use of the term “criminal justice” at all.  Given the widely articulated concerns 
about structural inequality and the massive U.S. prison population, is “criminal 
justice” an accurate or appropriate description of the nation’s model of 
criminalization, policing, prosecution, and punishment?  Framed as deep structural 
critiques, a new cluster of critical accounts refers simply to the “criminal system” 
or the “criminal legal system,” omitting any reference to justice.4 
In a moment of crisis and reexamination for criminal law and policy, it is fair 
to say that even the basic terms are up for debate.  While it has become popular to 
speak in terms of a “consensus” on criminal justice reform,5 it is not clear how 
broad and meaningful any such consensus is or even what “reform” means.6  
Scholars have leveled increasingly damning critiques at mass incarceration, 
racialized policing, and the dramatic expansion in the carceral state, but they have 
done so from many disparate and distant corners.7  Armed with different 
methodologies, disciplinary tools, and normative and ideological commitments, 
they have undertaken different battles and waged different wars, sometimes joining 
forces, but sometimes moving at cross purposes.8  The carceral state may be under 
siege, but not by a unified army. 
                                                                                                                                                      
system in Massachusetts was ‘not a “system” at all, but rather a myriad of unconnected bureaucracies 
lacking shared goals, adequate resources, or clear policy direction.’”). 
4   See, e.g., Gabriel Arkles, Correcting Race and Gender: Prison Regulation of Social 
Hierarchy Through Dress, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 859, 862 (2012); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and 
the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 617 (2009); Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban 
Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043 (2013); Andrea J. Ritchie, The Pertinence of Perry to 
Challenging the Continuing Criminalization of LGBT People, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
63 (2013); Michael Zuckerman, Criminal Injustice, HARV. MAG. (Sept.–Oct. 2017), 
https://harvardmagazine.com/2017/09/karakatsanis-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/C2B7-
PLJV] (quoting civil rights attorney Alec Karakatsansis, noting that “if you say things like ‘the 
criminal justice system,’ people might get the sense that you’re talking about a system that does 
justice”). 
5   See, e.g., Eric Holder, Remarks at the National Press Club, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 297, 299 
(2015); Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How Bipartisan 
Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 
126–27 (2017). 
6   See generally Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3135053. 
7   See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (2009); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS (2015); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE 
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY 
IN AMERICA (2006). 
8   See generally Levin, supra note 6. 
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Enter Sharon Dolovich and Alexandra Natapoff.  In their ambitious and 
exciting edited volume, The New Criminal Justice Thinking,9 Dolovich and 
Natapoff step back from the fray to take stock of the critiques, the moves, the 
methods, and the commitments that are shaping the current moment in scholarship 
and commentary.10  Dolovich and Natapoff do not offer a comprehensive typology 
of critiques, nor do they provide readers with a survey of each discipline or group 
of scholars that has waded into the tangle of criminal justice.  Instead, the book 
offers a sampling of essays from leading voices in law, sociology, and criminology 
that each provide a range of insights and analyses. 
The book is divided into five parts, with four of them structured around essays 
and responses: (1) “Systemic Perspectives”;11 (2) “Legal Doctrine in Principle and 
Practice”;12 (3) “Getting Situated: Actors, Institutions, and Ideology”;13 and (4) 
“Humanizing the Question.”14  Each of these parts contains at least one anchor 
essay that articulates a specific problem or approach to criminal scholarship.  Each 
part also contains at least one response essay framed (to varying degrees) as 
inspired by that part’s anchor essay.  Only two essays truly stand alone: Dolovich 
and Natapoff’s “Mapping the New Criminal Justice Thinking” (the introduction)15 
and Mariana Valverde’s “‘Miserology’: A New Look at the History of 
Criminology” (which comprises the entire fifth part of the book entitled “The New 
(Old) Criminal Justice Thinking”).16  While neither of these two essays features a 
formal “response,” each is deeply responsive to the themes and arguments 
introduced throughout.  They stand as responses not to a specific essay or a 
specific argument, but as broader responses to an amorphous body of scholars and 
literatures focused on the problems of the carceral state. 
This Review treats the two standalone essays that bookend the volume as 
lenses through which to view not only the rest of the essays, but the broader 
moment in criminal justice thinking.  Dolovich and Natapoff in their introductory 
“Mapping” treat the criminal system as a sprawling entity (or set of entities) that 
extends well beyond the traditional confines of the criminal courtroom or the other 
spaces of criminal law and procedure.17  That is, in thinking about criminal justice, 
they suggest, we must be willing to confront a vast web of institutions that are 
                                                                                                                                      
9   THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 
2017). 
10  See generally Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Introduction: Mapping the New 
Criminal Justice Thinking, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 9, at 1–30. 
11  See THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 9, at 31–108. 
12  See id. at 109–96. 
13  See id. at 197–272. 
14  See id. at 273–322. 
15  See Dolovich & Natapoff, supra note 10. 
16  See Mariana Valverde, “Miserology”: A New Look at the History of Criminology, in THE 
NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 9, at 323–38. 
17  See generally Dolovich & Natapoff, supra note 10. 
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embedded in and shape the social, economic, and political framework of daily life.  
Where Dolovich and Natapoff provide a broad vision of what comprises the 
criminal system, Valverde provides a similarly broad vision of what comprises 
criminological scholarship.18  Her historical account finds the roots of criminology 
in a range of sources—from the novels of Victor Hugo, Elizabeth Gaskell, and 
Émile Zola, to the theorizing of Frederick Engels.19  Just as the introduction 
provides a call to seek out the impact and institutions of the criminal system in all 
corners of society, so too does the closing essay invite us to look more widely for 
sources, wisdom, and authority as we consider the “New Criminal Justice 
Thinking.” 
This Review proceeds in two Parts.  Part I uses the Dolovich and Natapoff 
essay as a frame through which to read the book’s contributions and to highlight 
the growing universe of scholarship that reflects their broad conception of the 
criminal system.  Part II uses the Valverde essay as a frame through which to 
question and examine sources of authority and hierarchies of knowledge in the 
current moment of criminal justice reform.  Drawing on a growing body of 
scholarship that centers or elevates the voices of activists and individuals directly 
affected by the criminal system,20 I ask to what extent Valverde’s essay might have 
significant presentist lessons.  I conclude by asking how criminal justice scholars 
and scholarship does and should (or shouldn’t) interact with other accounts of the 
system produced by journalists, filmmakers, attorneys, and others.  How might 
such a move lead scholars to question baseline assumptions and examine more 
radical solutions? 
 
II. A BOUNDLESS CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
The scope of the criminal system has long been a source of debate, and a 
survey of scholarship by legal academics does little to resolve the question of 
which laws, which institutions, and which actors are a part of the system.21  
Theories-of-punishment scholars and others concerned with overcriminalization 
                                                                                                                                      
18  See generally Valverde, supra note 16. 
19  See id. at 330–31. 
20  See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3061917 [https://perma.cc/
7HZG-XWHZ]; Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 352 (2015); Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585 (2017); 
Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 
(2014). 
21  See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007) (examining 
criminal law’s role in a range of disparate social institutions); Andrea L. Dennis, Criminal Law as 
Family Law, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 288 (2017); Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 
39 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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have debated the proper scope of criminal punishment at great length.22  But a 
range of scholars increasingly has shifted away from the normative question of 
justified criminalization (i.e., when is criminal law or criminal punishment 
justified) or even the descriptive question of statutory criminalization (i.e., what 
conduct does the law proscribe) to ask a bigger descriptive question—where is 
criminal law operating surreptitiously or what is the importance of under-examined 
aspects of the system?23  As Jonathan Simon has argued, criminal law and 
criminalization have become the vehicles for addressing social problems; as he 
puts it, the state is “governing through crime.”24  While we know a great deal about 
the massive expansion in substantive criminal codes over the course of the last half 
century,25 that just tells us about formal criminal law and criminalization—i.e., 
what conduct is now the subject of criminal prohibition.  But recent years have 
seen an increasing focus on collateral consequences, low-level offenses, and the 
pervasive role of criminal law in structuring the lives of marginalized 
populations.26 
                                                                                                                                      
22  See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(2008); HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE 
INNOCENT (2011); Andrew Ashworth, Conceptions of Overcriminalization, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
407 (2008); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress 
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747 (2005); Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to 
Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1533, 1535 (1997); Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157 (1967), reprinted in 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17 (1968); Erik Luna, The 
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005); Victor Tadros, Criminalization 
and Regulation, in THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 163 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010). 
23  See, e.g., supra note 21; Sharon Dolovich, Teaching Prison Law, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 218 
(2012); Benjamin Levin, Criminal Labor Law, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 43, 44 (2016); 
Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (2013); Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2015); Jenny Roberts, 
Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321 (2015); Noah D. 
Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Contemporary Child Support Enforcement and 
Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 929 (2016). 
24  SIMON, supra note 21.  See also infra note 97 (discussing the use of criminal law as a 
replacement for the welfare state and for other regulatory regimes). 
25  See, e.g., HUSAK, supra note 22, at 1–41; Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and 
Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 227 (2007); Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: 
Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1599 (2012); William J. 
Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 
1, 4–5 (1997). 
26  See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595 (2015); 
Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1789 (2012); Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: 
Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418 (2012); 
Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611 (2014); 
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 255 (2015); Michael Pinard, 
Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 963 (2013); Jenny 
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011). 
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Identifying the criminal system’s reach is not merely a theoretical or sematic 
inquiry; it also has significant implications for institutional design.27  As Bernard 
Harcourt has argued, “practically all of the normative content [of the phrase 
‘criminal justice system’] is determined by the very definition of the boundaries of 
the system itself.  The normative work is thus already accomplished sub silentio by 
setting the scope of the system . . . .”28  That insight resonates heavily with 
Dolovich and Natapoff.  “If we are to fix the current criminal system,” they explain 
in their introductory essay, “we need a complete and nuanced understanding of 
what exactly the system is: What social and political institutions, what laws and 
policies, does it encompass?”29  Dolovich and Natapoff identify “the criminal 
system” as the vast web of regulations, institutions, and actors.30  The identification 
of this web with its amorphous and changing nature serves as a unifying theme for 
the essays that follow. 
Throughout The New Criminal Justice Thinking, we see the various 
contributors struggle to define the system and its relevant actors.  While none of 
the scholars set out to define the limits of the “criminal justice system” (or 
“criminal system”), the authors repeatedly reckon with the system’s scope.  Issa 
Kohler-Hausmann suggests that we retire the trope of the law on the books versus 
the law in action.31  As she puts it, law, by its very nature, requires enforcement 
and rests on the decisions of the enforcers.32  We shouldn’t be surprised by the 
tension, she argues.  Rather, we should embrace the messiness: the law is the law 
in action, and what matters is “how frontline legal actors come to understand law 
on the books in the first instance.”33  Whatever laws, actors, and institutions may 
comprise the criminal system, we should be able to agree that the system is much 
more than a collection of statutory text housed in the criminal chapters of state and 
federal codes. 
In keeping with this expansive view, the essays demonstrate a move beyond 
the sort of criminal law and procedure scholarship that focuses exclusively on 
felonies, culpability, and the realm of malum in se.  Instead, the sociological or 
criminological bent of many of the essays reflects Kohler-Hausmann’s call for 
                                                                                                                                      
27  Indeed, as Sara Mayeux argues, characterizing a disparate set of institutions and actors as a 
“system” is an inherently normative project.  See Mayeux, supra note 2, at 5–7; see also Harcourt, 
supra note 2, at 5–7. 
28  Harcourt, supra note 2, at 5.  Harcourt suggests that much writing, thinking, and 
policymaking about the administration of criminal law reflects “the mistaken belief that there could 
be a non-normative, objective, or neutral—that is to say, scientific—Archimedean point from which 
we could establish the proper parameter of the figurative system in question . . . .”  Id. at 7. 
29  Dolovich & Natapoff, supra note 10, at 1. 
30  See id. at 1–3. 
31  See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Jumping Bunnies and Legal Rules: The Organizational 
Sociologist and the Legal Scholar Should Be Friends, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, 
supra note 9, at 246, 246–47. 
32  See id. at 267. 
33  Id. 
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interdisciplinarity and, consequently, there is a focus on the operational details of 
the system.  This shift, which is not surprising given the editors’ seminal work in 
sociology and criminology, yields a focus on low-level offenses and prison 
conditions. 
 
A. Mass Processing as Mass Incarceration 
 
Violent crime is a major part of the system and serious violent crime needs to 
be reckoned with in any reform movement,34 but addressing low-level crimes and 
the quotidian administration of justice allows for a more systemic approach or a 
broader engagement with the structures and institutions of criminal law.35  That is, 
understanding mass incarceration requires confronting the mass processing of 
defendants that occurs in courtrooms across the country.36 
Natapoff, in her essay on “the penal pyramid,” focuses on low-level offenses 
and the different treatment reserved for different types of offenses (or classes of 
alleged offenders).37  She asserts that the system as applied to affluent defendants 
is a different system from the one that governs the conduct of poor or marginalized 
defendants.38  Natapoff claims that the bottom of the pyramid (i.e., prosecutions of 
poor defendants, particularly for less serious crimes) is a space that cannot be 
described with reference to legal doctrines and formal rules.  At the same time, she 
suggests that the top of the pyramid (i.e., prosecutions of privileged defendants) 
actually retains the procedures, rules, and framework of constitutional criminal 
procedure.  In Natapoff’s account, there are (at least) two different systems.  
Traditional, doctrinal legal scholarship might describe what goes on at the top of 
the pyramid, but it has little to say about the bottom.  Conversely, sociological 
accounts that focus on social dynamics and discount legal rules provide 
tremendous insight into the workings of the pyramid’s base, but they may be of 
less use when it comes to describing white collar investigations, and the like. 
                                                                                                                                      
34  See, e.g., JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK 
AMERICA 221–22 (2017); GOTTSCHALK, supra note 7, at 165–69; PFAFF, supra note 7; Alice 
Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571, 621 (2011). 
35  There certainly is a vast body of criminal scholarship (at least in the legal academy) that 
does not purport to offer a systemic account or systemic critique, but merely engages with individual 
doctrines and their justifications.  I do not mean to suggest that there is some impenetrable wall 
between that more traditional criminal law scholarship and the sorts of approaches adopted by the 
scholars in this volume.  Indeed, the projects may often be complementary.  I simply wish to 
emphasize that the more traditional model was historically less concerned with low-level crime and 
questions of criminal law’s administration.  In contrast, much of “the new criminal justice thinking” 
focuses on these areas as a means of understanding the criminal system as a social, political, and 
bureaucratic institution. 
36  See generally Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 26 (describing the process by which courts 
process misdemeanor defendants). 
37  See Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, 
supra note 9, at 71. 
38  See id. 
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Whether Natapoff is correct, as an empirical matter, that the top of the 
pyramid retains a respect for due process values or a more legalistic framework,39 
the underlying claim is critical: the system is not monolithic.  It is not simply that 
poor defendants have access to fewer resources.  It is—as scholars have 
observed—that the system is not a system.  The securities fraud prosecution in the 
Southern District of New York looks very different from the simple assault 
prosecution in Cook County, which looks very different from the homicide 
investigation in Dade County, or the material support investigation carried out 
online by federal agents.  In each of these places and in each of these cases, there is 
an administrative reality—“frontline legal actors” (prosecutors, but also law 
enforcement officers, magistrates, judges, and defense attorneys) have developed 
methods for addressing, processing, and disposing of cases.  If Natapoff is right, 
we might assume that the process accorded the SDNY securities fraud case looks 
more like Law (as a set of doctrines and practices that is cloaked in the language 
and trappings of authority and legitimacy),40 while the process accorded the simple 
assault case looks like, well, something else. 
Rachel Barkow and her respondents, Stephanos Bibas and Daniel Richman, 
speak to the need to address this sort of systemic variety and perhaps also to that 
“something else.”  Natapoff and Kohler-Hausmann, both here and elsewhere, have 
described an assembly-line-style adjudicative process as the method by which 
courts dispose of misdemeanors, low-level crimes, and poor defendants (largely 
poor people of color in urban jurisdictions).  Barkow’s intervention is different, but 
shares a similar interest in the way in which the criminal system fails to represent 
the ideals of an adversarial process.41  Barkow has been a vocal proponent of 
                                                                                                                                      
39  It is worth noting that a significant amount of the literature on overcriminalization points to 
white-collar or regulatory offenses as a space defined by criminalization’s over-reach.  See, e.g., GO 
DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING (Gene Healy ed., 2004); Alex 
Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) A Federal Criminal, in IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE: 
LEADING EXPERTS REEXAMINE THE CLASSIC ARTICLE “THE AIMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW” 43–56 
(Timothy Lynch ed., 2009); Marc A. Levin, At the State Level, So-Called Crimes Are Here, There, 
Everywhere, 28 CRIM. JUST. 4, 4–6 (2013).  One might conclude that these critiques are motivated by 
a libertarian, neoliberal, or “deregulatory” impulse.  Nevertheless, I think that it is worth asking to 
what extent similar patterns of prosecutorial pressure, plea bargaining, and even aggressive or violent 
law enforcement also might play out at the top of the pyramid.  This is not to disagree with 
Natapoff’s fundamental claim about different systems embedded within the system.  Rather, it is to 
suggest that the pathologies of the system may extend quite broadly.  The impact of these dynamics 
might be less dramatic at the top of the pyramid; but that does not mean that those dynamics are not 
still at work. 
40  See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (W.D. Halls trans., 
1984) (1893); RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE 
FRANKFURT SCHOOL 59 (1981); DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT (Beard Books 2006) (1975). 
41  See generally Rachel Barkow, The Criminal Regulatory State, in THE NEW CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 9, at 33–52. 
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viewing the criminal system through the lens of administrative law and seeking 
administrative solutions.42 
While Barkow’s essay does speak to concerns about the regulatory apparatus 
of the criminal system and the ways in which prosecutors and courts effectively 
process and manage populations, the normative implications of her move to 
administrative law appear to be very different.  Barkow—unlike Natapoff and 
Kohler-Hausmann—does not frame the administrative realities of the system as 
(necessarily) a bad thing.  Unlike her respondent Stephanos Bibas, Barkow does 
not suggest that the system has gone awry in straying from the space of an 
idealized morality play.43  Instead, she suggests that the system is failing to operate 
effectively as an administrative apparatus.44  That is, taking a sort of technocratic 
approach, Barkow expresses concerns about the ways in which policymakers have 
failed to adopt evidence-based solutions and have created a system that is both 
destructive and ineffective.45 
In some sense, then, Barkow’s essay and its responses speak to an issue that 
appears to lurk below the surface of The New Criminal Justice Thinking: do 
scholars actually agree on what’s wrong with the system and what the system 
should do?  I take the answer to that question to be a resounding “no.”46  In a 
certain respect, the fact that a diverse collection of scholars does not agree on 
matters of first principles is hardly worth mentioning.  It would be remarkable—if 
not slightly unsettling—to find fourteen authors who had thought deeply about a 
topic and ended up feeling the same about critical big picture questions. 
Reading Barkow’s essay in the context of both the direct responses and the 
other essays that take a different tack is valuable in and of itself.  But it is critical 
to appreciate the ways in which a difference in frame, in method, or—perhaps 
most significantly—a difference in worldview makes essays that often appear to 
speak in unison diverge.  Do we want the criminal system to resemble an 
administrative (or bureaucratized) regulatory system?  Or do we want the criminal 
system to focus on public education or displays of public morality?  Do we think 
that a “penal pyramid” is inevitable or desirable—i.e., is a rationing process a 
legitimate means of doing criminal law?  Or should lawmakers craft legal rules and 
allocate resources so that every case and every defendant are treated similarly?  By 
                                                                                                                                      
42  See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 717 
(2005); Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law as Regulation, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 316, 316–17 
(2014); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873–74 (2009); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial 
Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 272–75 (2013). 
43  See generally Stephanos Bibas, Improve, Dynamite, or Dissolve the Criminal Regulatory 
State?, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 9, at 61–70. 
44  See Barkow, supra note 41, at 45–46. 
45  See id.  This is not to say that Barkow celebrates the administrative model.  Rather, taking a 
pragmatic approach, she treats the regulatory model of criminal law as a fixed starting point.  See 
generally id. 
46  See generally Levin, supra note 6. 
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providing descriptive accounts of low-level criminal administration, The New 
Criminal Justice Thinking helps us appreciate the realities of the system(s), but, for 
the most part, it leaves unanswered these questions of values or normative 
commitments that might inform future scholarship. 
 
B. Incarceration’s Place in “Mass Incarceration” 
 
Certainly, focusing on the front-end apparatus of criminal processing is 
essential to appreciating the realities of the criminal system.  But seriously taking 
to heart the multiplicity and unbounded nature of the system (or non-system) 
requires thinking beyond the front-end administration or processing of cases.  As 
Dolovich, Jonathan Simon, and their respondents remind us, in a moment of mass 
incarceration, we need to reckon with incarceration. 
Dolovich has written broadly on prisons and on courts’ complicity in the 
degradation of prison conditions and the lives of incarcerated people.47  A powerful 
and recurring trope in Dolovich’s scholarship has been the relative invisibility of 
the prison in U.S. legal scholarship and law schools: she rightly notes that prisons 
and prison conditions are largely absent from the core doctrinal courses on 
criminal law and procedure.48  Despite massive prison populations and much-
deserved hand wringing about mass incarceration, prisons and the laws that govern 
(or don’t govern) them receive surprisingly little attention in the legal academy and 
in the canon of law taught in U.S. law schools.  Indeed, this line of critique has 
gained ground in the courts.  Justice Anthony Kennedy has emphasized the 
importance—and under-appreciation—of prison conditions as a part of the U.S. 
criminal system: “[t]oo often, discussion in the legal academy and among 
practitioners and policymakers concentrates simply on the adjudication of guilt or 
innocence.  Too easily ignored is the question of what comes next.  Prisoners are 
shut away—out of sight, out of mind.”49 
In a number of doctrinal critiques, Dolovich has shown how courts’ deference 
to prison officials effectively enhance this invisibility.  The shield of judicial (and 
legislative) deference make prisons a lawless space, insulated and legitimated (or 
                                                                                                                                      
47  See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 23; Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the 
Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259 (2011); Sharon Dolovich, Forms of Deference in 
Prison Law, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 245 (2012); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the 
Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (2009); Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration 
American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237 (2009); Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and 
Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437 (2005); Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern 
Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2011); Sharon Dolovich, Two Models of the Prison: Accidental 
Humanity and Hypermasculinity in the L.A. County Jail, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 965, 967 
(2012). 
48  See generally Dolovich, supra note 23. 
49  Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy 
does go on to note that “[t]here are indications of a new and growing awareness in the broader public 
of the subject of corrections and of solitary confinement in particular.”  Id. at 2210. 
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“kosherize[d],” to use Hadar Aviram’s formulation)50 by the legislature and the 
judiciary.51  Dolovich’s contribution here, as well as the responses of prison law 
scholars Aviram and Lisa Kerr, addresses these troubling issues involving prison 
officials.  While Aviram focuses on questions of institutional competence in 
understanding that deference, Kerr focuses on the rights (or lack thereof) afforded 
to incarcerated mothers as a means of understanding prison social function and 
dysfunction.  Kerr and Dolovich take a largely doctrinal tack, while Aviram 
advocates for the use of “systems theory.”52  But the effect is the same: to shed 
light on an otherwise dark and obscured corner of the system.  That is, if we were 
to take the book’s introduction as a challenge, this trio of essays shows how 
rigorous engagement with a neglected (or, at least relatively less studied) area of 
the system can yield benefits. 
Indeed, Jonathan Simon’s contribution, taken alongside Dolovich’s, speaks to 
those tangible benefits.  Simon, in his essay, calls for a judicial embrace of 
“dignity” as a concept in regulating the system and, specifically, in regulating 
punishment.53  Combined with Dolovich’s call to reexamine and reign in 
“deference,” Simon outlines not only a research agenda for scholars, but also a 
potential litigation strategy for advocates.  I remain skeptical of the turn to dignity.  
“Dignity,” Jeffrey Fagan suggests in his response to Simon, functions similarly to 
“legitimacy” in the procedural justice literature.54  While Fagan’s analogy is 
framed in approving terms, I worry that dignity and legitimacy might be 
susceptible to similar critiques: the concepts face concerns about indeterminacy, 
and they might elevate the perception of fairness over substantive fairness.55  That 
is, dignity, like “rights” or “legitimacy” provides a language for describing a 
problem, but it does not have clear content in terms of a solution because there is 
not necessarily a broader societal agreement on what constitutes dignity.56 
                                                                                                                                      
50  Hadar Aviram, Taking the Constitution Seriously?: Three Approaches to Law’s 
Competence in Addressing Authority and Professionalism, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
THINKING, supra note 9, at 155 (citation omitted). 
51  See, e.g., Dolovich, Forms of Deference in Prison Law, supra note 47; Dolovich, Cruelty, 
Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, supra note 47. 
52  See Aviram, supra note 50. 
53  See generally Jonathan Simon, The Second Coming of Dignity, in THE NEW CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 9, at 275–307. 
54  Jeffrey Fagan, Dignity Is the New Legitimacy, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, 
supra note 9, at 308–22. 
55  While there is an extensive procedural justice literature that treats legitimacy and 
perceptions of legitimacy as goals in and of themselves, there is a growing critical literature that is 
skeptical of legitimacy as a goal or that views procedural justice scholarship as embracing too narrow 
a vision of justice and social change.  See, e.g., Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling 
of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2083 (2017); Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon 
and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2190 (2013); Eric J. Miller, Encountering 
Resistance: Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 298 (2016). 
56  The Court, for example, uses the same word to describe the harm suffered by an individual 
in solitary confinement as the harm suffered by a state when the federal government challenges its 
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The potential limitations of “dignity” and the possibility that it will serve a 
negative legitimating function are very much worth discussion.  But it is 
impossible to ignore the importance and effectiveness of the dignity turn in recent 
prison litigation (and impact litigation, generally).  As Simon notes, the Supreme 
Court (at least Justice Kennedy) has been particularly receptive to arguments 
framed in the language of dignity.57  Certainly that language was at the heart of the 
majority opinion in Obergefell, but it also served as the backbone of the Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Plata58 and has recurred in Eighth Amendment cases.59  Like 
the language of rights, then, the language of dignity may have serious flaws.  But, 
what Simon helps show us is that it may provide assistance to the attorneys and 
activists seeking to effect change on the ground.  
 
III. A BOUNDLESS CRIMINAL JUSTICE LITERATURE 
 
The question of legal scholarship’s interaction with the movement(s) to 
reform the criminal system brings us to the second theme or set of questions that 
runs through The New Criminal Justice Thinking: what is “criminal justice 
thinking” and who gets to do that thinking?  Reading the volume reveals not only a 
concern with identifying the criminal system itself, but also with identifying or 
conceptualizing the field.  By necessity, the charge of taking the criminal system 
seriously in its breadth would also require a literature (or “thinking”) of great 
breadth. 
In her essay, Valverde provides such an expansive vision of criminal justice 
thinking.  Her essay tracks the nineteenth century practitioners of “miserology”—
novelists, social workers, and activists who studied or wrote about “misery.”60  
Valverde in turn defines “misery” with reference to Victor Hugo’s work: “Poverty, 
the miserologists said, has always existed, and exists still in the countryside; but 
misery—a hybrid of moral degradation, physical ill health, spatial marginality, and 
collective despair—was found only among the new urban proletariat.”61  
According to Valverde, these miserologists have been forgotten by or excluded 
                                                                                                                                                      
authority.  See generally Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 
1252–58 (2016). 
57  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595–96 (2015); Va. Office for Prot. & 
Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 258 (2011); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 
U.S. 743, 760 (2002); Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008).  For an extensive, critical 
account of the Court’s reliance on dignity in recent decisions, see generally Litman, supra note 56, at 
1252–58. 
58  563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
59  See generally JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE 
COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA (2014).  See also Hall v. Florida, 134 
S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014). 
60  See Valverde, supra note 16, at 330. 
61  Id. 
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from the academic discipline of criminology, but she contends that the 
miserologists deserve credit “as the pioneers of ‘criminology.’”62 
Despite its interdisciplinary focus, The New Criminal Justice Thinking 
generally restricts its interdisciplinarity to the social sciences, primarily sociology.  
(This should come as no surprise given the importance of sociologists, or at least 
scholars housed in sociology departments, to the discussion of the U.S. criminal 
system.)  The historical (or at least historicized) approach in Valverde’s essay 
provides a breath of fresh air and offers a different frame for the conversation.  Her 
intellectual history initially feels slightly jarring—a departure both temporally and 
methodologically from the rest of the book.  But it ends up working perfectly as a 
frame both for the essays in the volume and also for what the volume omits.63 
There are perhaps two different ways to read Valverde’s essay as framing 
discussions of the new criminal justice thinking: (1) we should be more open to 
different disciplinary or methodological approaches (i.e., a cramped understanding 
of “criminology” and “social science” led to the marginalization of the 
miserologists);64 or (2) we should be more open to voices outside of the academy 
(i.e., the miserologists lacked the trappings and authorities of “expertise” and 
therefore have been forgotten and neglected by academics).65  This Part examines 
those two frames in turn. 
 
A. Thinking Outside the Methodological Box 
 
The pro-interdisciplinarity frame is probably the most straightforward way to 
read the essay as a lens for the rest of the volume.  The miserologists, particularly 
Hugo and Émile Zola, brought an entirely different set of tools to their analysis or 
treatment of crime and social subordination.66  So, we might view the closing essay 
as reflecting a more open-minded take on which fields and which approaches 
should be a part of the “new criminal justice thinking.”  Such a frame fits naturally 
with a volume that reflects different literatures, different methods, and different 
approaches to what might ostensibly be similar research questions. 
Several of the essays explicitly advocate for a specific methodology as a 
means of confronting otherwise under-examined features of the system.  Aviram 
                                                                                                                                      
62  Id. at 337. 
63  I mean “omits” in the most generous sense of the word.  A book, by its very definition, is a 
bounded enterprise.  I would have been pleased to find more writing on collateral consequences, 
more historical work, and at least one contribution by a non-professor author in the volume, but these 
ultimately are personal preferences.  As noted at the outset of this Review, the literature on the 
criminal system, much less the literature that might be dubbed “new,” is massive, spanning 
disciplines and genres.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a collection that could have been 
truly representative and could have captured the wealth of critiques and voices that define the 
contemporary discourse.  As sins go, sins of omission in such a context seem quite venial indeed. 
64  See Valverde, supra note 16, at 331–32. 
65  See id.  
66  See id. at 330–31. 
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argues for the application of “systems theory” as a means of moving beyond the 
limitations of the “legal model” and the “sociological-empirical approach” to 
addressing the law of the prison.67  Aviram contends that “systems theory 
complements doctrinal analysis and socio-legal critique by showing how the very 
nature of constitutional communications limits their usefulness for criminal justice 
reform.”68  Mona Lynch calls for a “social psychology of criminal procedure” that 
would “develop a more theoretically and empirically grounded model of 
individuals as nested in organizational contexts.”69  Lynch argues that this 
approach will help “address[] how American criminal law is made and put into 
action” and “emphasize the process and flow of criminal justice, as propelled by 
system actors, rather than just the outputs.”70  In her response to Lynch, Priscilla 
Ocen endorses the social psychological approach, but offers Critical Race Theory 
as a methodological partner that might work in tandem with Lynch’s proposed 
approach.71  Meanwhile, Kohler-Hausmann’s response to Lynch essentially argues 
that “the organizational sociologist and the legal scholar should be friends.”72  
Kohler-Hausmann contends that organizational sociology allows for a critically 
important “conceptual shift: moving from conceptualizing formal organizational 
rules and structure as providing immediate and clear directives for action to 
conceptualizing them as tools or plans that must always be made sense of and 
implemented in concrete action settings.”73 
As a heavily interdisciplinary field, the study of criminal justice benefits from 
these and other insights.  While the book focuses largely on sociological insights, it 
is worth noting the impact of historians,74 anthropologists,75 political scientists,76 
                                                                                                                                      
67  See Aviram, supra note 50, at 155. 
68  Id. 
69  Mona Lynch, The Situated Actor and the Production of Punishment: Toward an Empirical 
Social Psychology of Criminal Procedure, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 9, 
at 199, 201. 
70  Id.  
71  See Priscilla Ocen, Beyond Ferguson: Integrating Critical Race Theory and the “Social 
Psychology of Criminal Procedure,” in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 9, at 
226, 228. 
72  Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 31, at 246. 
73  Id. at 248. 
74  See, e.g., MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND 
THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S (2005); ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON 
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016); 
Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880–1920, 77 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 101 (2006); Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15 (2016). 
75  See, e.g., CRIME’S POWER: ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF CRIME (Philip 
C. Parnell & Stephanie C. Kane eds., 2003); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 
34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 132 (2011); Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury: Rape, 
Law, and Culture, 65 STAN. L. REV. 457, 481 (2013); Jean Comaroff, Anthropology and Crime: An 
Interview with Jean Comaroff, 33 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 133 (2010); 
2018] RETHINKING THE BOUNDARIES OF “CRIMINAL JUSTICE” 633 
and a range of other scholars on the growing critical literature.77  Like the authors 
in The New Criminal Justice Thinking, scholars from a range of disciplines have 
come to critique the U.S. system of mass incarceration with its historically 
unprecedented prison populations and its outsized impact on marginalized 
communities. 
In some sense, the expansive vision of the criminal system discussed in Part I 
necessitates such a multi-faceted approach.  Imagining law as some sort of neutral 
science governed by unambiguous statutes and apolitical judges might allow for a 
single methodological approach, perhaps a doctrinal approach rooted in a 
hermetically sealed vision of the legal system.  But, law does not and cannot 
operate in a vacuum.  It is, by necessity imbedded in society, reliant on individual 
actors and their values, and heavily contingent.78  In his seminal work on the 
promise of “critical legal histories,” Robert Gordon argued that scholars should 
attempt to offer “thickly described accounts of how law has been imbricated in and 
has helped to structure the most routine practices of social life.”79  By describing 
the essays as “criminal justice thinking,” Dolovich and Natapoff do not signal a 
type of study.  Rather, they signal an object of study, albeit, an amorphous and 
uncertain one.  Juxtaposing these essays, then, represents a step in the right 
direction towards Gordon’s goal. 
It is worth noting, though, that a sort of intradisciplinary scholarship might be 
missing from this account.  That is, if we believe that the criminal system is a big 
socio-legal phenomenon that affects housing, employment, family law, etc., then it 
is important to recognize the role of (or potential for) scholars from a range of 
fields within the legal academy in adding to these unbounded critiques.80  Put 
simply, the siloing of legal areas is a major obstacle to a necessarily holistic and 
sweeping critique, not to mention a more expansive vision of what reform could 
look like.81  Barkow’s essay and, to a lesser extent, Kerr’s, suggest a move towards 
                                                                                                                                                      
Jennifer Devroye, The Rise and Fall of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 100 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 7, 14 (2010). 
76  See, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 7; Amy E. Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, Staying Out of 
Sight? Concentrated Policing and Local Political Action, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
202 (2014); Vesla M. Weaver et al., Detaining Democracy? Criminal Justice and American Civic 
Life, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6 (2014). 
77  See, e.g., RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND 
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 85–86 (2007); CALEB SMITH, THE PRISON AND THE 
AMERICAN IMAGINATION (2009). 
78  See, e.g., JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 1–4 
(1983); GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: HOW IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE 
LEGAL MIND 8–13 (1999); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 125 
(1984); Benjamin Levin, Values and Assumptions in Criminal Adjudication, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
FORUM 379, 387 (2016). 
79  Gordon, supra note 78, at 125. 
80  See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 21, at 288; Zatz, supra note 23, at 929. 
81  See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work 
Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 166–69 (2007); Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A 
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this intradisciplinarity.  But criminal law scholars should not only look outwards, 
seeking insights from colleagues in other departments.  They also should consider 
what lessons can be learned from other legal disciplines, areas that have had and 
are having their own reckonings with questions of distributive justice, state power, 
and punitive impulses. 
 
B. Thinking Outside the Institutional Box 
 
From an academic’s perspective, one of the exciting things about the current 
moment in “criminal justice reform” is the significant role that academics have 
played in public discourse and in shaping and shifting conversation.  From 
Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow,82 to books by James Forman, Jr.,83 John 
Pfaff,84 and Heather Thompson,85 work by academics is cited broadly outside of 
the academy and is used to illustrate and support structural critiques.86  Similarly, 
                                                                                                                                                      
Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5 (2011); Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical 
Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law 
Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 756–57 (2010); Benjamin Levin, Made in the U.S.A.: 
Corporate Responsibility and Collective Identity in the American Automotive Industry, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 821, 875 (2012). 
82  See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 7.  Perhaps more than any contemporary academic 
work on the criminal system, The New Jim Crow captured the public’s imagination and had 
measurable effects on policy makers’ decisions.  See id. at ix (Cornel West describing the book as 
“the secular bible for a new social movement in early twenty-first-century America”); FORMAN, 
supra note 34, at 220 (describing the D.C. City Council’s hearings on marijuana decriminalization 
and recounting that “various witnesses [at hearings] cit[ed] The New Jim Crow and one city council 
member explain[ed] that the book had ‘compelled me to be heavily engaged in the conversation.’”); 
GOTTSCHALK, supra note 7, at 3 (“[T]he contributions of Alexander’s The New Jim Crow cannot be 
underestimated.  No other book has been so vital in making the problem of the carceral state starkly 
visible to the wider public and in rallying members of disadvantaged communities and other groups 
to take on the project of dismantling it.”). 
83  See FORMAN, supra note 34. 
84  See PFAFF, supra note 7. 
85  HEATHER ANN THOMPSON, BLOOD IN THE WATER: THE ATTICA PRISON UPRISING OF 
1971 AND ITS LEGACY (2016). 
86  See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Perspectives on Police, Policing, and 
Mass Incarceration, 104 GEO. L.J. 1531, 1534–36 (2016) (describing The New Jim Crow as “a 
modern classic” and observing that “The New Jim Crow makes a notable contribution to public 
discourse, shedding light on how society became trapped in the current web of overzealous 
punishment and then pointing the way out.”); Adam Gopnik, Learning from the Slaughter in Attica, 
NEW YORKER (Aug. 29, 2016),  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/29/learning-from-
the-slaughter-in-attica [https://perma.cc/466M-QLJN]; Chase Madar, Hard Time: Two Books Explore 
the Roots of the Criminal-Justice Crisis, BOOKFORUM (Sept. 2017), http://www.bookforum.com
/inprint/024_03/18449 [https://perma.cc/9LHQ-T6S5]; Khalil Gibran Muhammad, Power and 
Punishment: Two New Books About Race and Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/books/review/locking-up-our-own-james-forman-jr-
colony-in-nation-chris-hayes.html [https://perma.cc/T6GH-NLYZ]; Mark Oppenheimer, ‘Blood in 
the Water,’ a Gripping Account of the Attica Prison Uprising, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), 
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critiques that have percolated in the academy have gained prominence in policy 
circles and even in mainstream media.  At the same time, the current moment in 
criminal justice reform has been defined by widespread public engagement, by 
increasing coverage in a range of (traditional and new) media outlets, and by 
activism and bottom-up social movements. 
Valverde’s essay implicitly raises the question of what (or who) we might be 
missing in our discussions of the criminal system.  That is, who are today’s 
miserologists?  While The New Criminal Justice Thinking includes a range of 
voices, some voices are (by necessity) left out.  Yet, it is worth wondering which 
voices might have been excluded, or what voices might have an outsized role in 
the discourse.  Notably, Valverde stresses that “miserology was almost completely 
an extra-university phenomenon . . . .”87  Like the pre-Marxian “utopian socialists,” 
miserologists were dismissed because they did not produce the “superior form of 
knowledge” associated with “university-based” study.88  “[T]he conventional 
history of criminology reenacts this questionable binary opposition separating 
science (university-based science) from social reform whenever ‘the origins’ of 
criminology are traced.”89 
Valverde’s essay resonates with a body of legal scholarship and movement 
activism that seeks to elevate or amplify the voices of individuals and communities 
most affected by the system.  Ocen, in her essay on critical race theory, speaks to a 
“commitment to centering voices from the margins so as to fundamentally shift 
perceptions of social institutions.”90  She “argue[s] for the explicit inclusion of 
external actors, such as community activists, who are often unaccounted for . . . 
despite their important role in driving institutional action.”91  Elsewhere, Amna 
Akbar similarly argues that legal scholars should “imagine with social 
movements,” adopting or at least taking seriously more radical and totalizing 
critiques that might have gained ground among marginalized populations.92  
Central to Akbar’s “radical imagination of law” is the idea that scholars should be 
willing to look to language, arguments, and approaches that might not fit squarely 
within accepted narratives or methods.93  Akbar—like Allegra McLeod94—
                                                                                                                                                      
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/books/blood-in-the-water-a-gripping-account-of-the-
attica-prison-uprising.html [https://perma.cc/9UA4-YNDK]. 
87  Valverde, supra note 16, at 331.  She states that this point “cannot be emphasized enough.”  
Id. 
88  Id. at 332. 
89  Id. 
90  Ocen, supra note 71, at 228.  
91  Id. 
92  Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, supra note 20, at 7–8, 21. 
93  See generally id. at 7–8. 
94  See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 
1156 (2015).  See also ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 22–39 (2003); DEAN SPADE, 
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suggests that a part of this project might involve legal academics taking 
abolitionism seriously.95  Appreciating the kinds of radical critiques that have 
driven the Movement for Black Lives and other activists means not treating current 
modes of policing, punishment, or criminal adjudication as fixed points.96  Rather, 
these approaches might require a totalizing reappraisal of the system, its 
commitments, and its place in a broader political economy.97 
I hardly mean this analysis as a criticism of the scholarly project or a 
suggestion that university-affiliated scholars, armed with a specific methodological 
toolkit and subject-matter expertise, have little to add.  Rather, I mean to suggest 
that—taking Valverde’s essay as a frame—we might imagine a more fluid line 
between the criminal justice thinking in the academy and the criminal justice 
thinking in courtrooms, community centers, and other spaces outside of 
universities.  That thinking might emphasize different priorities or advocate for 
different types of solutions than the ones familiar to some scholars.  Or, we might 
be more willing to embrace interventions from different corners of the academy or 
from approaches that, at first blush, might appear foreign or unfamiliar.  The 
centering of outsider voices might take different forms—from ethnographies and 
interviews,98 to the study of sources other than cases, statutes, and “official” 
documents.99 
                                                                                                                                                      
NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 
11 (rev. ed. 2015). 
95  See Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, supra note 20, at 57–72. 
96  See id. 
97  See id.  While Akbar frames this intervention in more radical terms and grounds it in the 
language of social movement activists, it is worth noting that other scholars have recognized the ways 
in which the study of criminal law and the criminal system cannot be divorced from a reckoning with 
structural flaws baked into the U.S. political economy.  Douglas Husak has argued that “a 
comprehensive theory of criminalization require[s] nothing less than a theory of the state.”  HUSAK, 
supra note 22, at 120.  Bernard Harcourt, Nicola Lacey, Loïc Wacquant, David Garland, and a range 
of other scholars have leveled critiques of the criminal system as a pathological feature of 
neoliberalism, capitalism, or the U.S.’s particular political economy.  BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE 
ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 40–44 (2011); 
NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN 
CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 170–73 (2008); LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE 
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 1–3 (2009); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF 
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).  These critiques raise 
important questions not only normatively, but also descriptively: how have scholars justified these 
institutions or how has conventional thinking about criminal justice been embedded in the same 
ideologies and political economies that yielded this moment of crisis?  One way of reading Akbar, 
alongside Ocen and against the backdrop of Valverde, is that looking outside of the academy or elite 
social spaces might be a helpful first step in addressing these deeper questions. 
98  See generally Bell, supra note 55 (using interviews to shed light on perceptions of police 
among heavily policed people of color). 
99  See generally Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, supra note 20, at 2 
(comparing documents produced by the Movement for Black Lives to documents from the Ferguson 
Report prepared by the Department of Justice).  Indeed, it is worth noting that many of these 
approaches are (in one form or other) well-established academic methodologies in their own right, 
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Of course, we might be concerned about too fluid a line or about an uncritical 
embrace of any voices or thinking about the system.  Different writing has 
different audiences and different arguments have different goals.  The nuance that 
defines the essays of The New Criminal Justice Thinking would be a poor fit in a 
work of legal advocacy or in a document exhorting activists to join a movement.  
And that nuance is critically important to check, sharpen, or shift critiques and 
narratives that might take hold in public discourse.  It certainly is possible that 
popular accounts or emotionally resonant events could yield a flawed “Standard 
Story” that misstates facts or misdirects attention.100  That said, perhaps we might 
read Valverde as a cautionary tale: regardless of discipline, training, or method, we 
might be tempted to reenact the “questionable binary” that would elevate one form 
of critique or study over another.  Maybe that binary has its place.  But Valverde’s 
essay should serve as a warning and a reminder that “criminal justice thinking” can 
take many forms.  We neglect those forms and those voices at our peril. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Recognizing the unbounded nature of the criminal system is deeply unsettling 
and presents challenges for commentators with diverse disciplinary, 
methodological, ideological, and political commitments.  But this boundlessness 
also invites an unbounded set of critiques—a boundless critical literature 
committed to rethinking the values, assumptions, and institutions that have yielded 
our current moment of mass incarceration.  Elsewhere, I have critiqued the failure 
to recognize and respect differences among those voices—just because many 
scholars agree that the system is broken doesn’t mean they agree about what the 
system should do or how to fix it.101  And, those disagreements—whether first-
order or more fine-grained—are critically important to the reconstructive process.  
Despite its essay/response format, The New Criminal Justice Thinking does not tee 
up those disagreements.  At times, the fault lines begin to show, but for the most 
part, the book operates more as a vehicle for putting arguments and analyses on the 
table, rather than for duking it out over the course and meaning of criminal justice 
reform.  Some of those fights are already underway, and, to the extent they aren’t, 
they will arise inevitably.  In the meantime, it is a tremendous service to the rest of 
us—regardless of our vision of “criminal,” of “justice,” and of “reform”—to be 
able to go to a single place to hear from the scholars who have helped lay the 
groundwork for the current moment of struggle and of possibility.  The question 
remains “what is to be done?” 
                                                                                                                                                      
even if they are minority approaches in U.S. law schools.  That is, they represent a mode or modes of 
scholarly treatment, rather than a rejection of scholarly treatment. 
100 See PFAFF, supra note 7, at 8. 
101 See Levin, supra note 6. 
